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Abstract 
Purpose: The literature on demutualization is confined to efficiency 
and social welfare issues. Little empirical literature exists on the 
effect of demutualization on listed firms. This study examines the 
impact of demutualization on the liquidity of listed firms’ stocks.  
Methodology: It empirically investigates how the liquidity of listed 
firms’ stocks is affected by demutualization. Analyzing data of 137 
non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for 2005 
to 2017, we employ fixed effect regression to test the hypotheses. 
Findings: We find that demutualization has significantly improved 
liquidity. We analyze all three dimensions of liquidity that are the 
trading activity, market impact, and transaction cost. We find that 
demutualization increases trading activity, improve market depth, 
and has reduced the transaction cost.   
Implications: Our findings suggest that demutualization is 
beneficial not only for listed firms but also for its shareholders as 
all three dimensions of liquidity are improved by demutualization. 
Stock exchanges that are not demutualized and are facing liquidity 
problem, can be improved by changing its structure from mutual 
to demutualized. 
Originality: Prior literature focuses on the impact of 
demutualization on the stock market or social welfare. There is 
scares research on the effect of demutualization of the listed firm. 
This study fills this gap by analyzing the impact of demutualization 
on listed firms' liquidity in a developing economy, such as Pakistan. 
Received 2019-12-18 
Revised 2020-01-11 
Accepted 2020-01-12 
Published 2020-01-12 
Keywords 
Demutualization 
Liquidity  
Turnover  
Amivest ratio 
Bid-Ask Spread  
How to cite? 
Ali, F., Wang, M., Ali, I., & Ali, S. T. 
(2020). Does Demutualization Spur 
Liquidity? SEISENSE Journal of 
Management, 3(1), 15-26. 
doi:10.33215/sjom.v3i1.278 
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s) 
 
SEISENSE Journal of Management 
Vol 3 No 1 (2020): DOI: https://doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v3i1.278 , 15-26 
Research Article 
 
16 
Introduction 
Stock exchanges traditionally operated as non-profit or membership organizations. Decisions were made based 
on one-person-one-vote. There was no competition or regulations. The market makers or members of the 
exchange controlled the price, range of services, and quality of services produced by the stock exchange. 
Members had decision-making power, ownership, and trading rights.  In mutual exchanges, ownership is not 
transferrable but is terminated if a member quit. These exchanges performed monopoly businesses on their 
local markets. Companies have no option but to list on their local exchange, and investors have the only option 
to invest their money in their local market. Since 1993 when the first stock exchange of the world, the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, was demutualized, the business environment of stock exchange has been 
dramatically changed. 
Moreover, this change is continued as more and more exchanges are getting demutualized. Through 
demutualization the non-profit member-owned exchanges are converted into for-profit investors-owned 
limited companies. Demutualization is motivated by globalization, technological advancement, regulatory 
reforms, and the introduction of new financial products. Due to the changing business environment for the 
stock exchange, they also needed to react accordingly, but it was not possible under the mutual structure. 
More research is needed to identify how firms’ stock liquidity is affected by demutualization, as this relationship 
is largely unidentified. There are both regulatory and economic aspects of demutualization which affect all 
stakeholders and the economy. Prior studies focused on either the regulatory issues connected to 
demutualization or on the relationship between demutualized exchanges and their financial performance. This 
paper explores the relationship between demutualization and stocks of listed firms traded on these converted 
exchanges. We focus on what firms gain from demutualization. This is the main question to be addressed in 
this study. This is done through empirically analyzing firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited (PSX), 
which is demutualized in 2012. 
Liquidity is important to be analyzed because it ultimately affects the cost of capital. It will be hard to sell a 
security that has low trading volume because it pushes the ask-bid spread to be high. This will be reflected in 
the prices; hence it makes the stock less desirable for investors. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) were among 
the pioneers who explore the relationship between bid-ask spread and stock returns and find that when the bid-
ask spread is broader, investors will expect higher returns to compensate for the trading cost. The higher bid-
ask spread will result in high volatility and low liquidity, which will push transaction cost higher. As a result, the 
market participants will expect higher returns to remunerate this higher transaction cost.  Measuring liquidity 
through turnover rate, Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) found that liquidity significantly affects the variations 
in stock returns. Therefore, liquidity is important for both firms and stock exchanges on which they are traded.  
This study aims to explore the relationship between demutualization and stock liquidity. This study sheds light 
on how firms gain from demutualization in terms of liquidity.  
The rest of the paper is organized into different sections. Section 2 is the review of the literature regarding 
demutualization and its various implications. In section 3, we developed a hypothesis on the effect of 
demutualization on liquidity. Section 4 explains the methodology. Section 5 provides the empirical results, and 
we conclude the paper in section 6. 
Literature Review 
The term demutualization is defined as the transformation of a non-profit entity owned by members to for-
profit corporations owned by its investors (Karmel, 2000). The traditional mutual exchanges were run by 
members, and only they had access to the trading activities. Lee (1998) argued that members or brokers ran 
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mutual exchanges, and investors have to pay a fee to these brokers for their services if they want to trade on 
the stock exchange. This made them resistant to change because their competitive position and source of 
revenue were at risk. The demutualization process often consists of four steps; the first one is to obtain the 
consent of regulatory bodies and government, then transferring rights of membership to shares, followed by 
the listing of exchange and public issuance,  with eventual or immediate freely traded shares (Hughes & Zargar, 
2006). Since the inception of demutualization in 1993, a large number of stock exchanges around the globe 
have demutualized. These include stock exchanges of countries like the USA, UK, Australia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, among others.   
According to the report of the World Federation of Exchanges published in 2017, around 66% of the world’s 
exchanges have been demutualized. This percentage is expected to increase as more and more stock exchanges 
are planning to demutualize. Globalization and technological advancement have changed the traditional view 
of exchanges. The introduction of ECNs and computerized exchanges has eliminated the need for 
intermediation. It has limited the presence of brokers on the trading floor. Now investors are not obliged to go 
to the trading floor for listing and trading physically. These technological advancements have allowed investors 
to trade on exchanges throughout the globe. This increased the competition among exchanges, and to get the 
market share; they need to adapt to these changes. The traditional member-owned exchanges have many 
drawbacks as they are not flexible to the changing environment (Steil, 2002). 
Demutualization literature is mostly composed of regulatory issues and the financial performance of exchanges. 
Analyzing the relationship between demutualization and stock exchange efficiency, Hart and Moore (1996) find 
a significant improvement in efficiency after the demutualization of the stock exchange. Steil (2002) is of the 
view that demutualization reduces the control of brokers. Cybo-Ottone, Di Noia, and Murgia (2000) argue that 
demutualized exchanges should run as a for-profit entity and should serve the interest of exchange rather than 
the interest of members. Aggarwal (2002) argues that these converted exchanges accompanied by a change in 
governance structure have to represent outside shareholders. Taking an example of three stock exchanges that 
were demutualized, Aggarwal (2002) find that the shares price performance of these exchanges is improving 
since the day of demutualization. The share price and the number of shareholders are increasing since the day 
exchanges became public companies. 
Researchers also analyzed stock exchange performance after demutualization to found whether it is improved 
by demutualization. Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) find that demutualization improves the market 
quality of stock exchanges. In their study, Schmiedel (2001) find that the demutualization of exchanges 
positively affects cost efficiency. These exchanges perform 20-25% better than the efficiency benchmark. 
Market size, change in the governance structure, trading services diversification, and adoption of new 
technology has a greater influence on trading services. Schmiedel (2002) finds that the European stock exchange 
has progressed in efficiency from 1993 to 1999. The introduction of new technologies, changes in governance 
structure, and innovation have resulted in greater growth in these stock exchanges. Due to improved 
governance and efficiency, the operating and market performance of demutualized stock exchanges have 
improved (Aggarwal & Dahiya, 2006). Angel (2003) find that demutualized exchanges react faster to changes, 
and that is more cost-efficient for investors in trading. This is an advantage that demutualized exchange has 
over a mutual one. Considering the Australian Stock Exchange (ASE) merger as a case, Otchere and Abou-
Zied (2008) argue that the trading activity and profitability ratios of the Australian Stock Exchange have 
improved with demutualization. In his study, Azzam (2010) find that demutualization enhances financial 
performance, liquidity, and size and reduces its debt. Padilla-Angulo and Ben Slimane (2018) argue that 
demutualization, when accompanied with a change in governance structure, improves the efficiency of 
exchanges. They also argue that demutualization ameliorates the reputation of stock exchanges. Analyzing 
demutualization’s short and long term impact on the performance of stock exchanges, Slimane and Angulo 
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(2018) find that it improves long term performance, while there is no significant improvement in performance 
in short-term. They also find that this enhanced performance is moderated by restructuring in corporate 
governance.  
There is scarce literature, which focuses on the effect of demutualization on firms that are listed on these 
exchanges. Taking the case of Euronext merger Nielsson (2009) finds that stock liquidity of listed firms has 
increased after demutualization. However, this liquidity is asymmetrically distributed across firms. He argues 
that the liquidity of firms with foreign sales and large firms has significantly increased after the merger, while 
the merger does not significantly affect the liquidity of medium and small firms. Researchers also found no 
evidence in an increase in the liquidity of firms that operate domestically. Studying the relationship between 
exchange consolidation and returns volatility, Ben Slimane (2012) find that there is no significant impact of 
consolidation on volatility.  This study contributes to the literature by finding the relationship between the 
demutualization and liquidity of listed firms, which is overlooked by literature. 
Hypothesis Development 
Abundant literature exists on the effect of demutualization on different outcomes, but these studies are only 
confined to the theory of the firm. Most of the previous studies discuss financial performance, efficiency, or 
social welfare issues (e.g., Azzam, 2010; Ben Slimane & Padilla Angulo, 2017; Padilla-Angulo & Ben Slimane, 
2018; Serifsoy, 2008). There is scarce literature that analyzes demutualization from investors and listed firms’ 
perspective. Moreover, many theoretical models explain investment and shareholders' behavior. However, not 
much is known about how demutualization affects investment decisions.  
Nielsson (2009) suggested that firms can gain stock liquidity from demutualization due to several reasons. First, 
after demutualization, the market may be broadened due to which there may be a larger number of participants 
in the market trading in the stocks of listed firms. Eventually, as a result of the increase in the number of market 
participants, every firm will deal with a larger number of investors. Second, after demutualization, the market 
may deepen, which means that a large number of stocks are available for investors at prices slightly different 
from the existing market price. As individual and large trades are now unable to move prices, this will make the 
market more liquid. Third, firms may gain liquidity from demutualization because, after demutualization, 
transaction costs may be reduced. Transaction cost is reduced due to the merger of clearing and trading systems 
and an increase in trading volume. The European Commission estimated that after the merger of the stock 
exchange, 2 to 5 million euros could be saved that is spent on clearing and trading (Economist, 2006). It is 
expected that trading volume could be increased after demutualization because of the reduction in transaction 
costs. This study focuses on whether Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) has attracted volume after 
demutualization. 
Based on these arguments, it can be hypothesized that the liquidity of listed firms might increase after 
demutualization. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Demutualization positively influences the liquidity of listed firms’ stocks. 
Methodology  
Data and sample 
To compute different variables used in the analysis, this study obtained data from different sources. Data 
regarding stock prices and turnover is obtained from khistocks, which is an online website dealing with 
companies’ stock prices and other financial information. Our panel consists of yearly observations from 2005 
to 2017. Pakistan Stock Exchange that is demutualized in 2012 is the focus of this study. Our sample includes 
one hundred thirty-seven non-financial firms listed on it. The panel also includes some control variables in 
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which prior literature suggests that it may affect liquidity. These variables include some firm-specific variables 
whose data is obtained from the financial reports of the firms. We also controlled for GDP per capita, and its 
data is obtained from the World Bank’s database.  
The outcome variable of this study is liquidity, which can be calculated in different ways. A commonly used 
proxy for liquidity is trading volume, which can be defined as the number of shares of a company traded on 
the stock exchange over a particular period. Another proxy for liquidity is Turnover, which is used as the main 
variable in this study. Turnover is measured as the number of shares of a company traded over a particular time 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. It is considered a better measure of liquidity because it not only 
takes trading volume into account but also the number of outstanding shares.  
Trading activity, transaction cost, and market impact are different dimensions of liquidity. Turnover captures 
the trading dimension of liquidity that tells us about the trading activity of stocks of particular firms. This study 
aims to explore whether the amount of trading of listed firms’ stock is increased after demutualization or not? 
The turnover dimension of liquidity exactly answers this. However, following Nielsson (2009), we also included 
the market impact and transaction cost dimensions of liquidity in our study. These are measured by the Amivest 
ratio and the bid-ask spread, respectively.  
Liquidity Measures 
Turnover, which is the main variable of our study, measures the trading activity of the firm’s shares. However, 
we are interested in having a broader view of liquidity. For this purpose, two other dimensions of liquidity are 
taken into account. These two dimensions are transaction costs and market impact. Bid-ask spread captures the 
transaction cost dimension, while the Amivest ratio captures the market impact dimensions of liquidity 
(Nielsson, 2009).  
Amivest Ratio 
The market depth dimension of liquidity is captured and measured by the Amivest ratio. It measures how 
trading affects the market price of shares. This ratio is related to the marketability of stocks, that is, selling a 
great number of stocks without any significant price changes. Low price sensitivity is negatively related to 
liquidity and hence, will reduce uncertainty in the market place (Nielsson, 2009). Among others, Berkman and 
Eleswarapu (1998), Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997), and Cooper, Groth, and Avera (1985) used 
the Amivest ratio as a measure of stock liquidity. Amivest ratio is calculated as,  
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
∑ |𝑅𝑖𝑡|
𝑁
𝑡=1
 
Where Amivestit is the Amivest ratio of i firm at time t. Vit is the trading volume, and |Rit| is the absolute returns 
of ith firm at time t. N denotes each month trading days. 
Table 1 - Variables definition 
Notation Name of variable Definition 
Panel 1: Dependent Variable 
(Stock Liquidity) 
 
 
 
 
 
Turnover Turnover A number of shares of a company traded over a 
particular time divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. 
Amivest Amivest Ratio Trading volume divided by absolute returns 
Bid-Ask Spread Bid-Ask Spread Difference between bid and ask prices quotes 
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Panel 2: Independent Variable   
Demutualization Demutualization Dummy variable that takes 0 before 2012 and 1 
otherwise 
Panel 3: Control Variables   
ROA Return of Assets Net income divided by total assets 
Price Share price  Market price of firm stocks 
Leverage Leverage Book value of firm total liabilities divided by 
book value of total assets 
Size Firm Size Book value of firm’s total assets 
SD Volatility of Returns Standard deviation of firms stock returns 
GDP Gross Domestic Product Total value of goods and services produced in 
one year 
Crisis Dummy variable for 
financial crisis 
Dummy variable that takes 0 before 2008 and 1 
otherwise 
This table reports the definitions of variables used in this study. Panel 1 lists dependent variables; Panel 2 lists independent variables, 
and Panel 3 lists control variables. 
For a given month Amivest ratio measures the average trading volume of absolute returns. The higher the 
Amivest ratio, the more investors can trade without any significant price changes. Hasbrouck (2005) argued 
that the sample distribution of the Amivest ratio consists of outliers, so we follow the rule of thumb to take the 
natural log of the said variable.  
Bid-Ask Spread 
The cost dimension of liquidity is measured by the bid-ask spread. Transaction cost is measured through the 
difference between the bid and ask quotes. Bid-ask spread is calculated as, 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 =
𝑎𝑠𝑘 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑
((𝑎𝑠𝑘 + 𝑏𝑖𝑑)/2)
 
Where Spread is the ask-bid spread, while ask and bid are the ask and bid quotes, respectively. Different 
estimators are available in the literature to calculate bid-ask spread, i.e. Roll (1984), Thompson and Waller 
(1986), and Hasbrouck (2004). We used Thompson and Waller (1986) estimator in our study as it is used by 
various researchers to estimate spread (Bryant & Haigh*, 2004; Ma, Peterson, & Sears, 1992; Thompson, Eales, 
& Seibold, 1993). Thompson-Waller spread is calculated as,  
𝑇𝑊 =
1
𝑇
∑|∆𝑃𝑡|
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
where TW is Thompson Waller spread, T is a non-zero price change, and P is the stock price.  
Model specification 
We conducted a two-step analysis. First, we performed univariate analysis to find whether liquidity is improved 
after demutualization. We find the difference between means of the three dimensions of liquidity before and 
after demutualization. We performed a t-test to know whether these pre and post-demutualization means are 
significantly different. Second, we explore the impact of demutualization on liquidity. For this purpose, we 
propose three equations. First, we find how the trading activity is affected by demutualization, which is the 
main purpose of this paper. We use turnover as a proxy for trading activity. Fixed-effect regression is employed 
to find whether the liquidity of listed firms is affected by demutualization. The estimated model is,  
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𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where Turnoverit is the measure of liquidity for the ith firm at time t. Demutualization is a dummy variable that 
takes 0 value before demutualization (in our case, the year of demutualization is 2012) and 1 otherwise. A 
number of control variables are also included in this study that the literature suggests can affect stock liquidity. 
These variables are ROA, share prices, leverage, market capitalization, the standard deviation of returns, and 
GDP. We also include the control variable for the global financial crisis of 2008. All these variables are defined 
in Table 1.  
To know whether the market impact dimension of liquidity is affected by demutualization, we estimate equation 
(2). We have to find whether the market has deepened after demutualization. For this purpose, we specify the 
following model, 
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (2) 
where 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the Amivest ratio of ith firm at time t. 
To get a broader view of liquidity, we also investigate the cost dimension of liquidity. We analyze whether 
transaction cost is reduced after demutualization. To find this relationship, we estimate the following equation, 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (3) 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 is Thompson and Waller (1986) bid-ask spread. 
To find the impact of demutualization on liquidity, we estimate the unbalanced panel data model. We use 
Hausman (1978) statistic to choose between fixed and random-effect models. Hausman test finds whether there 
is any association between unobserved firm-specific random effect and the regressors. If this correlation is 
significant, we conclude that the fixed-effect model is more appropriate. However, if there is no significant 
correlation, then we conclude that the random-effect model is parsimonious and appropriate. Table 2 reports 
the results of the Hausman test, which suggests that the fixed effect model is consistent. 
Table 2 - Hausman specification test 
 Coef. 
Chi-square test value 113.784 
P-value 0.000 
This table reports the results of the Hausman test for model appropriateness. The Chi-square statistic and p-value are reported. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of all variables included in this study except demutualization, which is a 
dummy variable. The table gives the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (sd), minimum 
(min), and maximum (max) values of all variables. All these variables are defined in Table 1.  
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Turnover 1,759 16.02 3.051 4.605 23.61 
ROA 1,338 6.981 13.10 -163.3 67.96 
Prices 1,760 260.7 867.3 0.650 11,500 
Leverage 1,336 0.520 0.299 0.00592 3.318 
Size 1,338 22.91 1.506 18.17 27.16 
SD 1,761 3.377 1.758 0.849 7.599 
GDP 1,761 16.57 0.487 15.72 17.22 
Amivest 1,753 17.19 3.241 1.057 27.41 
Spread 1,616 10.26 0.976 5.368 13.93 
This table represents the descriptive statistic of all dependent and control variables. Turnover, Amivest, and Spread are dependent 
variables that all others are control variables. The sample includes yearly values for the period of 2005 to 2017. We excluded our 
independent variables (demutualization) from this table because that is a dummy variable that has only 0 and 1 value. 
There is not a big difference between the maximum and minimum values for all variables, which means that 
there are no extreme values. To visualize the trend of our dependent variables, a line graph is shown in Figure 
1 - Liquidity Trend. A general trend of the three proxies of our dependent variables is depicted in figure 1 for 
the whole sample. The blue line represents turnover, which is our main variable in this study. Other proxies of 
liquidity, which are the Amivest Ratio and Bid-Ask spread, are represented by red and black lines, respectively. 
The vertical dotted line represents the year of demutualization, which is 2012 in our case. Figure 1 shows that 
turnover has been increased after demutualization. Before demutualization, not only turnover is low but also 
has some sharp ups and downs. While after demutualization, the line does not show any sharp ups and downs. 
It seems that liquidity risk is minimized up to some extent after demutualization. Figure 1 shows the same trend 
for the Amivest ratio, while the spread has reduced. Reduced spread means increased liquidity. Overall, Figure 
1 - Liquidity Trend tells us that the liquidity of stocks has been increased after demutualization.  
 
Figure 1 - Liquidity Trend 
This figure shows the liquidity trend of stocks of listed firms from 2005 to 2017. The red line represents the Amivest ratio, the blue 
line represents the bid-ask spread, the black line represents turnover, and the vertical dashed line represents the year of 
demutualization, which is 2012. 
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Table 4 - Differences in the mean of the three dimensions of liquidity 
   Before 
Demutualization 
After 
Demutualization 
  Difference    t_value    p_value 
 Turnover  15.64 16.543 -.903 -5.9 0.000 
 Amivest 16.813 17.831 -1.019 -6.3 0.000 
 Spread 47675.78 34259.97 13415.81 5.1 0.000 
This table provides means of all the three dimensions of liquidity before and after demutualization. The difference is calculated as 
“mean after demutualization” minus “mean before demutualization”. The last two columns report t-value and p-value. 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of the univariate analysis. The mean values of the three variables, which captures all 
the three dimensions of liquidity are given before and after demutualization. We find that trading activity is 
significantly increased from 15.64 to 16.543 after demutualization. Considering the second dimension of 
liquidity, which the Amivest ratio, we find that this ratio is increased from 16.813 to 17.831. This tells us that 
the market has significantly deepened after demutualization. We observe that the bid-ask spread has reduced 
from 47675.78 to 34259.97 after demutualization. This means that spread has narrowed down, and transaction 
cost is significantly reduced by demutualization. Summing up the univariate analysis, we conclude that stock 
liquidity is improved after demutualization. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5 reports the results of fixed-effect regression for all the three equations of our study. Turnover is used 
as a measure of liquidity in this study. We tested whether demutualization enhances firms’ stock liquidity? This 
is answered in column (1) of Table 5. 
Interestingly, demutualization significantly affects turnover. Hence, the liquidity of the average firm has 
increased with demutualization. These results are consistent with Padilla and Pagano (2005) and Nielsson 
(2009). The reason behind this increase in stock liquidity is that the market has become efficient after 
demutualization (Serifsoy, 2008). Demutualization also reduces transaction cost and has resulted in increased 
market share (Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin, & Netter, 1999). As a result of enhanced efficiency, greater market 
share, and reduced transaction cost, more and more  
Table 5 - Fixed-Effect Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Turnover Amivest Spread 
Demutualization 1.613*** 1.157*** -0.430*** 
 (0.169) (0.221) (0.023) 
ROA 0.006* 0.152 -0.040 
 (0.003) (0.454) (0.053) 
Prices -0.000*** -0.000***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Leverage 0.283 0.410 0.031 
 (0.261) (0.340) (0.037) 
Size -0.007 0.125 -0.003 
 (0.124) (0.162) (0.017) 
SD -0.160* -0.420*** 0.020* 
 (0.085) (0.111) (0.012) 
GDP -1.464*** -1.745*** 0.713*** 
 (0.440) (0.575) (0.061) 
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crisis 0.379** 0.844*** -1.067*** 
 (0.164) (0.214) (0.023) 
Constant 39.929*** 43.415*** -0.478 
 (7.443) (9.729) (1.040) 
Observations 1,197 1,194 1,122 
R-squared 0.192 0.128 0.756 
This table reports the results of the Fixed-Effect panel model. The dependent variables are turnover (Turnover), Amivest ratio 
(Amivest), and bid-ask spread (Spread). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** mean p<0.01, ** mean p<0.05, and * mean 
p<0.1. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
participants are now involved in trading activity. This increases the stock turnover of the listed firms. We 
controlled for some firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. Results in column (1) of Table 5 show that 
ROA and crisis have a positive and significant impact on turnover, which is in line with Alves, Canadas, and 
Rodrigues (2015). Investors may be interested in buying the stocks of firms that have higher profitability. This 
will increase the trade of the firm’s stocks, resulting in an increase in stock liquidity. Stock prices, the volatility 
of returns, and GDP have a negative and significant relationship with turnover. We found that leverage and 
firm size have no significant impact on liquidity. 
The first section of our study shows that demutualization has increased trading volume for average firms. This 
resulted in an increase in trading activity, which ultimately increased firms’ stock liquidity. This directly answered 
our question of whether more participants are trading on the stock exchange after demutualization. We are also 
interested in exploring other dimensions of liquidity, that is, the transaction cost of trading, how much time it 
will take to complete a transaction, and how much it affects the prices. Column (2) of Table 5 reports the 
regression results of our second measure of liquidity, which is the Amivest ratio. The coefficient of the Amivest 
ratio is positive and significant, which means that the market has deepened after demutualization. Investors can 
trade in a larger volume of shares without greater changes in stock prices. These results are consistent with 
Nielsson (2009). Results for market activity (measured by turnover) are the same as market depth (measured by 
the Amivest ratio). This means that demutualization has not only increased liquidity but also enhanced the 
market depth of stocks of firms listed on these demutualized exchanges. 
Column (3) of Table 5 reports the results of the impact of demutualization on the bid-ask spread. Results show 
that bid-ask spread has been narrowed down by demutualization, which implies that the transaction cost has 
reduced after demutualization. These results are consistent with previous studies (Arnold et al., 1999; Padilla & 
Pagano, 2005). Arnold et al. (1999) found that a reduction in the bid-ask spread was due to the merger of three 
stock exchanges in the United States. While Padilla and Pagano (2005) argued that reduction in the bid-ask 
spread was due to the unification of the clearing system after the merger. They find that bid-ask spread has 
been reduced by 27% due to the unification of the clearing system. In the current study, we also found a 
significant decrease in bid-ask spread by demutualization after controlling for firm-specific, market-specific, 
and some macroeconomic variables.  
To sum up, demutualization has improved all types of liquidity measures. The main focus of our study was on 
trading activity (measured by turnover), that is, we try to find whether the trading activity has increased after 
demutualization and whether investors can now easily trade on the stock market. The data supported our 
hypothesis that trading activity has increased for the average firm. To get a broader view of liquidity, we also 
find that demutualization has improved market depth (Amivest Ratio) and transaction cost (bid-ask spread). 
Conclusion 
We investigate the impact of demutualization on the liquidity of listed firms’ stocks. We find that 
demutualization has increased trading activity as the market has become broader after demutualization. More 
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participants trade on the stock exchange due to which trading volume has been increased. We also investigate 
two other dimensions of liquidity, namely, the Amivest ratio and bid-ask spread. We find that demutualization 
significantly increases the Amivest ratio. As the Amivest ratio captures the market dimension of liquidity, we 
conclude that market depth has improved after demutualization. Finally, we find that the bid-ask spread is 
narrowed down by demutualization.  Demutualization has reduced transaction costs due to which bid-ask 
spread has been narrowed down. We conclude that demutualization is beneficial not only for listed firms but 
also for its shareholders as all three dimensions of liquidity are improved by demutualization.  
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